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APPELLEES5 MISSTATEMENTS OF FACTS: 
Throughout their Brief, Appellees makes several material misstatements of fact, 
i.e., misstatements in that they are denied by the Record. Those misstatements and 
the place in the Record where said denial is found are: 
APPELLEES5 STANDING-
1 - PEHP 's request for declaratory judgment alleges PEHP suffered a distinct 
injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome. 
Appellees5 Brf., @ 8 & 13 
A close review of the Appellees5 Request for Declaratory Judgment makes no 
mention of this statement or any similar statement. Record, @ 1 - 6. 
SUFFICIENCY OF ORDER-
2- The Order contains all the items necessary to meet the requirements in the 
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures under Utah law and should be affirmed. 
Appellees' Brf. @ 9 [Order is Addendum "A".] 
But see Appellees' Brief- Addendum "B" - Adjudicative Hearing Procedures 
That is Section 7- entitled, ORDERS- states the hearing officer shall issue an order 
that includes: 
ii- a statement of conclusions of law; 
iii- a statement of reasons for the decision. 
In the Order there is no "statement" of the reasons for the decision. 
Appellees5 Brf. Addendum "A55 - Order 
The Hearing Officer made "conclusions" of law without referencing any 
factual support. Additionally, in "conclusions" numbered 3 and 4, the 
hearing officer provided no legal authority to support his "legal conclusions" 
Record, Order @ 337 Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 para. 26 [Utah, 
1999] commands more. It requires an ''analysis concerning the statutory 
criteria... It was error to [make conclusions] ... without applying the 
statutory standard for making such a determination." Without such an 
analysis, the trial court's findings cannot be upheld. 
Accordingly, we find the Hearing Officer's "Conclusions of LAW" that have no 
mention whatsoever referencing any legal authority and consequently, with no 
analysis of the supporting law as dictated under Young, said conclusions cannot be 
upheld. The fatally defective Conclusion of LAW totally void any supporting legal 
authority are: 
2- The contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy 
is legally enforceable. 
3- Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
And, 
4- The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires PEHP to be 
reimbursed $30,047.45 the amount it paid in medical expenses on behalf 
of Respondent Ms. Kramer for which she received a $100,000 settlement. 
Record, @ 338 
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But more importantly the Orders section [Section 7 a) (i) & (ii)] of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures [Appellees'- Addundum B] specifically 
mentions the phrases a "statement of finding of fact", a "statement of conclusions 
of law" and a "statement of reasons for the decision" thus, noting a difference 
among the three requirements. The mandatory requirement to issue an order with a 
"statement of reasons for the decision" is glaringly absent from the Order under 
review. Clearly, this mandate required the Hearing Officer to explain the reasons 
that supported his decision. Appellees' Brf., @ 19. The hearing officer failed to 
follow this mandate despite the Kramers5 specific written request to do so: 
At the hearing, there were several issues before you and Respondent's 
respectfully request your findings of fact on each material issue. 
my clients need to know what you decided, what your findings were 
on each of the issues before you and what conclusions of law you reached 
in support of same. Letter to hearing officer - Record, @ 330-331 
Continuing, under Section 7- Point (e) (iii), it says: the hearing officer shall 
consider any written objections and then prepare the final order. Here the 
Appellees' counsel prepared the final order. Appellees' Brf., @ 9 & 20. 
While Section 7 (e)(i) permits the hearing officer to delegate preparing the initial 
order to counsel, once written objections are filed and considered, then the Hearing 
Officer himself shall .... prepare a final order. See Section 7 (e) (ii) and (iii). 
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Thus, the Order did not contain all the items necessary to meet the requirements of 
the Adjudicative Hearing Procedures and the Hearing Officer delegated a non-
delegable duty to counsel. 
Problematic with the hearing officer's letter to counsel of 08/20/07 was his 
directive to Appellees' counsel to amend the earlier order and now "cite the 
statute relied on.55 Record, @ 334 How does Appellees' counsel know what 
statute the hearing officer relied upon in making his legal conclusion? Then he 
directs counsel to amend the conclusions of law to reflect he found the subro-
gation clause legally enforceable offering no indication upon what legal or factual 
authority relied upon in arriving at this conclusion of law. Record, @ 334 
FACTUAL DISPUTES-
3- Appellants: failed to actually dispute any facts before the Hearing Officer in 
their Memorandum in Opposition to PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and do not raise additional factual arguments here. Appellees5 Brf., @ 10 
And: 
the Kramers failed to allege any disputed facts. Appellees' Brf., @ 10 & 21 
And, 
The: Kramers failed to correctly dispute and thus agreed to the undisputed 
facts in the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Kramers failed to allege 
any disputed facts. Appellees' Brf., @ 21 
And, The Kramers provided no affidavits or actual contentions disputing any of 
PEHP's statement of undisputed fact. Appellees' Brf., @ 22 
The Record is replete with Appellants' dispute over: 1- PEHP's statement of facts, 
2- the understanding, intentions and consequences of the facts PEHP's stated, and, 
3- the Kramers' list of additional facts [that raised more disputes] that Appellees 
did not set forth in their Statement of Facts. See - Appellants5 Brf., @ xvi to xix 
for specific Record references to these factual disputes. 
Appellees have asserted blatant misstatements of facts. The Appellants' contest 
surrounding such misstatements of fact have created factual disputes. To wit, 
Appellees' assertion that: 
The PEHP Master Policy is the valid contract between PEHP 
and the Kramers. Brf., @ 11 
And, 
.. .both PEHP and the Kramers agree that the PEHP Master Policy 
was the contract between them.... Brf., @ 24 
The parties agree that the Kramers enrolled with PEHP and agreed 
to the terms of the PEHP Master Policy by signing the PEHP 
Enrollment Form. Brf,, @ 26 
These are major misstatements of fact. Appellants pointedly said: 
The Public Employee Health Plan [the Master Policy]: 
was not the Appellants' "insurance contract" 
Appellants' Brf., @ xix - @ 8 
And, 
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... the Plan itself was not Appellants' tlinsurance contract. " That 
is, Appellants signed the "Enrollment Form " which mentioned the 
PEHP's Master Policy but in violation ofU.C.A. 31A-21-106.... " 
Appellants' Brf., @ xxi @ 8 
And, 
If the PEHP Master Policy was not attached to the Enrollment Form, 
the insurance contract, but was only incorporated by reference then it is not 
enforceable against Appellants Appellants' Brf., @ 23, @ 8 
The Appellants signed the Enrollment Form. [Appellees' Brf., @ 6- @ 3] They 
did not sign the Master Policy. And it was not referred to when Appellant Kelly 
Kramer signed the Enrollment Form. Kelly Kramer's Affidavit, Record, @ 106 
To dispute Appellees' Statement of Facts, and to add other disputed facts not 
mentioned by Appellees in its "Statement of Facts.", Appellants followed the 
directives of Rule 7(c )(3)B of the U.R.C.P., to wit: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain 
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving's party's facts that is contro-
verted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute 
supported by citation to relevant materials such as affidavits or discovery 
material. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memo-
randum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
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The Appellants' Brief is replete with factual arguments why the Kramers disputed 
the Appellees' Statement of Facts with their Statement of Additional Facts with 
citations to the Record and legal authority. 
See Appellants' Brief with said Record references @ xiv to xx and pages 2 to 5 
and Record, @ 272 - 279 Respondent's Opposition to Summary Judgment 
APPELLANTS5 AFFIDAVITS-
4- Appellees assert that the: Kramers were required to provide affidavits.... " 
and the Kramers provided no affidavits. Appellees5 Brf.5 @ 22 
The is misleading as the Record contains an affidavit from both Appellants 
Kelly and Rose Kramer. Record, @ 106 & 107. Those affidavits went 
uncontested and in themselves created material factual disputes, i.e., PEHP never 
provided the policy, never explained the policy and PEHP offered it to the Kramers 
as an adhesion contract proposition, that is: you take it or leave it. // only takes one 
sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and 
create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Holbrook v. Adams, 542 
P.2dl91, 194 [Utah, 1975] 
Moreover, the Kramers needed to provide "affidavits" only if the moving party, 
Appellees, had filed affidavits. If the movant files no affidavits, the opposing party 
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can rest on his pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City, 542 P.2d 1086, 1088 [Utah, 
1975]; Rule 56 (e), U.R.C.P. 
UNENFORCABLE SUBROGATION RIGHTS-
5- The Kramers failed to point to any way in which the language could be 
reasonably understood in two different ways. Appellees5 Brf., @ 12 
This is misleading because Appellants never proffered that argument. They have 
always asserted that the language of subrogation provision of the Master Policy is 
unenforceable because the policy: 
a- is ambiguous in failing to define several material, technical terms. 
Appellants9 Brf., @ vi, xvii, xviii, 2, 18, 20-21, with Record cites. 
b- used terms that were not set forth in clear language readily 
understandable by the average purchaser of insurance. 
Appellants5 Brf., @ vii, xvii, 3, 21, with Record references. 
And, 
c- has operative terms that are hidden deeply in the policy. 
Appellants' Brf., @ vii, xviii, 4, 18, 25 with Record references. 
Next Appellees state: The Kramers ...merely lob allegations without support in 
making their claim without any explanation as to why the Master Policy provision 
is ambiguous , what terms are undefined would not be understood by the 
reasonable purchaser if insurance. Appellees5 Brf., @ 33 
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This is another blatant misrepresentation. The Record at 280 -282 identifies six 
operative, technical terms in the subrogation provision that are not defined. That 
Record offers arguments and legal authorities supporting Appellants5 positions. 
SANDBERG FACTUAL DISPUTES-
6- Appellees again mislead the court in stating: 
Nowhere does the Sandberg Court state or even imply that if the 
consequences of facts result in a dispute of law that it would preclude 
summary judgment. Apppellees' Brf., @ 24 
Appellants never offered the Sandberg holding as authority addressed to any 
"dispute of law.55 They offered Sandberg as authority for a way to find factual 
disputes that can preclude summary judgment, i.e., factual disputes can arise from 
the differences in the parties5 understanding, intentions and consequences of 
otherwise "undisputed55 facts. Appellants' Brf., @ 19 & 26 
INVALID INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE-
7- Continuing, Appellees state: ...the Master Policy does not incorporate the 
subro-gation provision, or any other provision, by reference. 
Appellees' Brf., @ 27 
Again, Appellants never made such an argument. Appellants have argued that the 
contract, the Enrollment Form incorporated by reference the Master Policy. They 
argued that the Master Policy was unenforceable for, to incorporate by reference a 
9 
document not attached to, nor set forth at length in, the contract violates Utah law. 
Appellants' Brf., @ vii - point E, xix, xxi - point 8, xxix - point D, 3-D, 17-B, 
23-24 point 8, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ERRORS-
8- In footnote 5 to its Brief, Appellees state that: The Kramers restate their 
argument made before the Hearing Officer in their Appellants' Opening 
Brief @ 20-26, but do not claim the Hearing Officer erred in making his 
conclusions of law. 
This clearly misstates the facts. Appellants5 Brief has several arguments supporting 
their claims that the hearing officer's "Conclusions of Law" were in error. 
Specifically, Appellants asserted that the hearing officer: 
1- referenced no legal authority on points 2 or 3 in his Conclusions 
of Law. Record - Order, @ 338 
And, 
2- adopted and rely upon an single authority in his first Conclusion 
of Law but that authority did not support the conclusion he made based 
upon it. Order, Record, @ 338 
Appellants' Brf., @ xx, xxii, 5, 6-7, 13, & 28-31, with Record references. 
In the context of this misrepresentation of fact, it is significant that in their Brief, 
Appellants devoted a three page argument addressed to the errors in the Hearing 
10 
Officer's reliance on U.C.A, 49-11-613 in finding that Appellees had standing to 
bring the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment. Brief, @ 28-31 
ENROLLMENT FORM-
Appellees allege that: the enrollment form contains no material terms between the 
parties, the PEHP enrollment form was not the contract between the Kramers and 
PEHP. Brf, @ 27. The Enrollment Form is page .... of the Record. Even a 
cursory reviewing the Enrollment Form shows it does have material terms wherein 
the insured: 
a- authorizes deductions for premiums and the release of information to 
health providers; 
b- certifies the his/her dependants as listed; 
and, 
c- agrees to use a preferred panel physicians and facilities. 
Record, @ 86- Section C 
CONTRACT LAW AUTHORITIES-
Appellees argue that since PEHP is "self-insured" it is not subject to the Insurance 
Code. Appellant has argued that it is subject to appellate holdings in contract law 
and if a holding involves the principles of contract law construction then that 
holding is applicable even if the opinion involved a dispute under an insurance 
contract. That is, if the holding involves contract law it applies to all contracts 
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whether the particular contract involves real estate, employment or insurance or 
other contracts. In Appellees' Brief they have agreed to this argument in citing the 
Gunn case: the subrogation provision in the Master Policy would be a ''matter of 
contract law interpretation." Appellees' Brief @ 12, 33 & 35 
MADE WHOLE ARGUMENT-
Next Appellees argue that the Kramers got a "large settlement" quietly suggesting 
Mrs. Kramer has been made whole. Brfv @ 25 This is not so and the Record 
refutes this argument. In her Affidavit, Mrs. Kramer attests that she suffered: 
a- a significant, 25% - 27% permanent injury; 
b- a significant loss in future earnings due to her permanent injury; 
c- some $50,000 in past medical bills; 
d- $10,000 in legal costs in securing her settlement; and, 
e- in excess of $500,000 in past and future special damages, 
Kramer Affidavit, Record, @ 106 & Appellees' Brf., @ xv 
Appellees never contested this testimony. It remained before the hearing officer 
unimpeached. A $110,000 settlement is not a large settlement when contrasted 
against over $510,000 in damages. Taking the 25% whole person impairment 
together with net recovery of far less than $50,000 and referencing it against some 
$450,000 in future special damages proves Mrs. Kramer was not "made whole." 
12 
APPELLEES HAVE NO STANDING-
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied 
before a district court may even entertain a question 
Washington County Water v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125,1129 [UT. 03] 
Appellants have vigorously contested the Petitioner's/Appellees' standing to bring 
the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment. The Appellees' Brief further 
supports this position. To wit: 
Appellees profer U.C.A., 63-46b-16(4) as the standard for review of this appeal. It 
says this Court can grant relief if: 
b) the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
f) the person taking the agency action .... were subject to disqualification, 
h) the agency action is: 
i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
Hi) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Appellees' Brf., @ 2 
Appellees then cite "Statutory Provisions." One such provision being U.C.A. 49-
11-613, entitled, Appeals procedure - Right of appeal to hearing officer -
Board Reconsideration - Judicial Review. Appellees set forth this statute at 
length. Brf., @ 3-4 In pertinent part it says: 
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I)(a) All members, retires, participants, alternative payees, or covered individuals 
of a system, plan or program under this title shall acquaint themselves 
b) Any dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation .... under this title is 
subject to the procedures provided for under this section. 
c) A person who disputes a benefit, right, obligation, under this title shall 
request a ruling by the executive director 
d) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director ... with 
respect to any benefit, right or obligation .... under this title, shall request a 
review of that claim by a hearing officer. 
2- The hearing officer shall: 
b) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this title. 
c) hear and determine all facts 
3- ' The board shall review and approve and deny all decision of the hearing 
officer. 
7- A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review.. 
8- The board may make rules to implement this section. 
Appellees' Brf., @ 2-3 & 15 
By specific statutory definition PEHP is "program." See U.C.A. 49-11-102 (32), 
entitled, Definitions and U.C.A. 49-20-102 also entitled, Definitions. Instantly, in 
the context of U.C.A. 49-11-613 (l)(a) members, participants .... of a program 
shall acquaint themselves with their rights. The members or participants are 
"people" under a plan or program. Then U.C.A., 49-20-401 addresses exactly 
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what programs can do. While it is an extensive listing it makes no mention 
whatsoever of a program having any authority to bring an action before the Board. 
It says programs can "process claims.55 Enforcing subrogation rights is not 
"processing a claim.55 
Additionally, under U.C.A., 49-11-613 (c )(d) only "persons" can bring disputes 
to the Board, request reconsideration of a Board decision and subsequently bring 
their dispute to a hearing officer. Appellees have argued that under U.C.A. 63, 
46b-2(l)(g) a person who can initiate administrative action includes "programs" 
like PEHP Appellees' Brf., @ 16 But that statute makes no mention of a 
"program.55 Moreover, the specific statutes under which the Board's programs 
were created and continue to operate under, did not grant such authority to either 
the Board [the executive director] or the "program.55 Nor, is there any reference 
that the "program55 is an agency or a governmental subdivision. A universal tenant 
of statutory law is when there are two statutes but one is specific while the other is 
general, then the specific statute controls over the general statute. 
Particular expressions qualify those which are general. 
CA Civil Code - 3534 
Here Appellees want to use a general statute [U.C.A. 63-46b-2(l)(g) - The 
Administrative Procedures Act] to support their position but the direct statute that 
15 
governs the exact questions in contest and the exact parties in this appeal [U.C.A. 
49-11-613 (c )(d) - The Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act] 
contradicts Appellees5 citation. Equally important, under U.C.A. 49-11-613 (b) it 
directly states that it is operative when its provisions differs from U.C.A. 63-46b. 
To wit: The hearing officer shall: 
b) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this title. 
Under this title, the Board [executive director] has no standing to bring the initial 
Request for Declaratory Judgment for "only persons can." And when the term 
"person" is used in a statute where in the same statute the terms "executive 
director", "the Board" and "a party" are also used, it is clear the legislature was 
assigning distinct and different meaning to each term. Each term in a statute is 
used advisedly. Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1168 [Utah, 
1995]; Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [UT, 1995] 
Clearly, only a "person" can bring a dispute to the executive director and later to a 
hearing officer. Just as clearly, the "executive director" can only make an initial 
determination of the dispute. "The Board" can consider applications for reconsid-
eration and has only review powers over the hearing officer's decision. It can 
implement this section. Then ''aparty aggrieved" with the hearing officer's 
16 
decision can seek the Board's reconsideration or move for appellate review. See 
U.C.A., 49-11-613, Subsections (c), (d), 3, 5, 6, 7, & 8. Subsection 8 states: 
The Board may makes rules to implement this section. 
Appellees now argue that the Board conferred authority upon itself to bring a 
dispute before the Board. And then it further delegated this authority to PEHP. 
Appellees say this action "explains the administrative hearing procedures." 
Appellees' Brf., @ 15. But to self-servingly grant such authority is well beyond 
"implementing" this section and it does nothing to "explain the administrative 
hearing procedures." For in their Brief @ 5, Appellees also cite the purpose of The 
Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act at U.C-A., 49-20-105 - Purpose: 
The purpose of this chapter is too provide a mechanism for covered 
employers to provide covered individuals with group health, dental 
medical insurance and other programs requested by the state 
in the most efficient and economical manner. 
For the board to confer upon itself the authority to bring disputes before itself 'is 
clearly not implementing "the purpose to provide insurance." This is especially 
true when the legislature did not grant it such authority when the legislature created 
it. This denial of authority is clear. In examining the wording of the statute it is 
evident that the legislature was aware of the differences among the members, the 
persons, the board, the executive director and insurance programs. 
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Furthermore, in elementary common sense it is likewise obvious under the statute 
[U.C.A., 49-11-613] and the purpose behind the Act, that the executive director 
and the board cannot put "self-interested" disputes before itself for a ruling. To do 
so is to abuse the authority to "implement" the statute as it would invite a conflict 
in the board [executive director] in having a self-interest in its rulings. This 
argument is further supported by the board's [executive director's] action in going 
straight to the hearing officer while bypassing the initial executive director ruling. 
To "implement" means "to execute", "to carry into effect" whatever it is you are 
charged with implementing. Instantly, under the purpose of the Act [U.C.A. 49-
20-105], to implement means the board can use its given powers "to provide a 
mechanism .... to provide covered individuals with group health, dental, medical, 
.. ..and other programs..." It does not mean the board can create new, distinct 
powers. It does not mean to engage in practices beyond the purposes of the Act. 
Again, we find the purpose statute making a clear distinction between "people", 
i.e., "covered individuals" in difference to "programs". Programs are insurance-
like plans providing medical, health and other benefits to covered individuals. For 
the board to confer upon itself authority to bring a dispute before the hearing 
officer is not "explaining the hearing procedures" as it has argued. 
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Another reason invaliding the board or executive director's action in appointing 
itself with such authority is that it directly interferes with the procedures set forth 
under the statute. U.C.A., 49-11-613 (b) says: any dispute regarding a right, 
benefit, obligation ...is subject to the procedures provided under this section. In 
granting itself the powers to bring its own declaratory action directly to the hearing 
officer, the board dispenses with the statute's pre-requisite of securing a executive 
director's ruling on the dispute before going to the hearing officer. Clearly, to 
abrogate the statutory procedures is to violate the plain mandates of the law. 
Appellees cite Gunn v. USRB, 2007 UT App. 4, for the holding that the Board has 
1- subject matter jurisdiction over all Title 49 disputes and, 2- a plaintiff must 
exhaust all administrative remedies before "appealing" a decision. Appellees cited 
Gunn: ... any right asserted against PEHP must be first submitted to the agency's 
review process. Brf., @17 Appellants agree. 
The Gunn Court required Mr. Gunn to follow the specific, procedural rules of the 
Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act. The Board and the executive 
director are not above the same directive. They also must follow the specifics of 
the law. In this instance it did not. Actually, in bringing the underlying Request 
for Declaratory Action the board violated the operative statute. There were two 
"administrative remedies" Mr. Gunn needed to exhaust before seeking relief in the 
court system, an executive director's ruling and then a hearing officer's ruling. 
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Here the Board amputated the first remedy of securing an executive director's 
ruling. That is, notwithstanding the clear mandated procedures charged to 
Mr. Gunn, the board just conveniently side-stepped this remedy, no doubt, due to 
its inherent conflict of interests. 
Appellees argue that the "new" Rules say the executive director: 
may file a petition for a declaratory order determining the applicability 
of a statute, rule or order of the Board... Brf. @ 15 
The issue in contest is the question of the validity of PEHP's subrogation rights 
against the Kramers' "made whole" rights. The subrogation rights are a provision 
of the PEHP's Master Policy. Under the Board's Administrative Hearing 
Procedure, as cited, these "rights" do not involve determining the applicability of: 
a- a statute, 
b- a rule, or, 
c- an order. 
The board's newly adopted administrative procedures are a verbatim track of 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act [U.CA., 63-46b-21(l)]. This 
statute has the very same limitations, i.e., all requests for action are limited 
to determining the applicability of a statute, a rule or an order. 
Appellees' Brf., @ 16 
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Accordingly, in this instance, the executive director has filed a Request for a 
Declaratory Judgment for a determination on an issue completely outside of any of 
the three reasons where under he supposedly has authority to file a petition. It is 
unmistakable that the executive director has clearly exceeded the parameters of his 
authority as he, himself, has memorialized in writing. 
Another argument is that U.C.A., §49-11-301(3) says the assets of the fund are for 
the exclusive benefit of the members and "may not be diverted or appropriated for 
any purpose other than that permitted under this title." Title 49 is silent on 
subrogation rights, save that a monthly disability payment "shall be reduced" for 
monies received by way of judgment or settlement from a third party liable for the 
disability. U.C.A., §49-21-402. The powerful argument is that if the Legislature 
saw fit to incorporate subrogation reimbursement provisions under a disability 
payment from the monies recovered from a liable third party, it could have inserted 
a like provision under the member claim's payment procedures but did not do so. 
Thus, you argue the Legislature's failure to incorporate such a provision was 
intentional, i.e., that each term used in a statute is used "advisedly" and since the 
Legislature "could have added" language but did not, it was intentional. Harmon 
City v. Neilsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995); Neel v. State, 889 
P.2d 922, 926, (Utah 1995). 
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Under the criteria of authority given this appellate court as set forth in U.C.A., 
63-46b-16(4), Appellants deserve relief for they have been substantially prejudiced 
by the facts that: 
b) the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
Clearly, the board [executive director] acted beyond the jurisdiction of 
U.C.A., 49-11-613. It went beyond "implementing" in taking actions far in 
excess of the purpose of the Act "to provide insurance like benefits " to 
"covered individuals." 
e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
Here the board [executive director] engaged in unlawful procedures and 
failed to follow prescribed procedures when it circumvented the specific 
procedures of the governing statute. It engaged in unlawful decision-making 
when it granted itself authority well beyond the purposes of the act, well 
beyond "implementing" the statute and in direct contradiction to both the 
terms and purpose of the statute. 
f) the person taking the agency action .... were subject to disqualification. 
The board, [the executive director] is subject to disqualification for 
circumventing the mandatory procedures of the statute and in conferring 
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upon itself authority that abrogated mandatory procedures and the purposes 
under the statute. 
h) the agency action is: 
i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
iii) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Conferring upon itself authority that circumvented the statute's purpose and 
which authority contravened the statute itself is far more than an "abuse of 
discretion5' and far exceeds the boundaries of "arbitrary and capricious." 
Because of the inherent conflict between the board bringing its own petitions and 
the need to dispense with the statute's mandatory procedure to permit this, and 
because of the inherent conflict between the board bringing its own actions and the 
fundamental purpose of the Act, our legislature did not confer any "petitioning" 
authority on the board. 
C O N C L U S I O N -
In contested cases, it is the duty of the trial court to finds facts upon all material 
issues submitted for decision unless the findings are waived. Boyer v. Lingell, 567 
P.2d 1112, 1114 [Utah, 1997] The hearing officer summarily found no issues in 
contest and he did this despite many contested factual issues and despite a specific 
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request directly from Appellants asking him to make factual findings on all the 
factual issues before him. 
So Appellants are battling a summary judgment based on a "summary" discharge 
of the hearing officer's mandated duties that made factual conclusions without 
actually addressing the facts. Additionally, he failed to perform his mandated 
duties by making his "conclusions of law" without citing his legal reasoning. And 
for the one legal conclusion he made wherein he did cite a legal authority, the 
authority does not support his conclusion. 
In granting summary judgment, the hearing officer found, that despite the 
Appellants' factual disputes, there were no factual disputes and thus, the 
Appellees' showing: 
precluded all reasonable possibilities that, if given a trial, Appellants 
could produce evidence which reasonably sustain a judgment in their favor. 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge, 354 P.2d 559, 562 [Utah, 1960] 
The hearing officer failed to give Appellants a "fair hearing." His errors are 
multiple, grave and manifestly and legally invalid. They denied Appellants "due 
process." 
... every person who brings a claim in court or at a hearing held before an 
administrative agency has a right ....to receive a fair trial in front of a fair 
tribunal. 
Burnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333[UT, 1987] 
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And, 
Despite the flexibility of administrative hearings, there remains the 
"necessity of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural 
fairness in administrative hearings ". 
Tolman v. S. L. County Atty., 818 P.2d 23, 28 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991] 
The Statutes under the Utah State Retirement Act and specifically the Public 
Employees Benefit and Insurance Act which created Appellees' authority did not 
authorize the Board or the PEHP, to initiate action. If the legislature did not grant 
them authority to prosecute the underlying Petition, then that lack of authority was 
intentional. Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1168 [Utah, 
1995]; Neel y. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [UT, 1995] 
For the reasons stated herein together with the reasons set forth in the Opening 
Brief and as supplemented by the Record, Appellants respectfully request this 
court reverse the hearing officer's grant of summary judgment. 
•k-k it-k Jc *-& * ± 
Date 28, May 2008 Remectfully submitted; 
. FAY 
ADDENDUM A 
APPELLANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE-
COMES Now Appellants and move this Court to strike from the record on appeal 
and from any consideration all references in Appellees' Brief to: 
A- Addendum "C"; and, 
B- the citation of UCA 49-ll-613(l)(e) 2008 - Brf. @ 15 
Re: NEWMAN AFFIDAVIT-
Addendum "C" is a 03/28/08, affidavit by a Robert Newman, relating that as 
Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Board that on 03/31/06, he 
authorized PEHP to file a Request for Declaratory Judgment. 
The Affidavit was never presented to the Hearing Officer. It was first presented in 
the Appellees5 Brief. It is a record created after the facts in dispute. In not being a 
record in the proceedings under review by this Court, and in being a document 
disputing the Appellants5 arguments contesting the Appellees' standing in bringing 
the original Petition, it is unduly prejudicial. 
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As offered, the Affidavit denies Appellants the opportunity to contest or cross-
examines the Affiant. Such an opportunity is an historical and fundamental 
foundational right underpinning our system of jurisprudence. 
For each of these reasons, Appellants respectfully requests this Court strike the 
Affidavit from the Record on appeal and give it no consideration by this reviewing 
Court. 
Re: U.C.A. 49-11-613 - [2008 law]-
The citation to the new version of U.C.A., 49-11-613 is an amendment to a law 
that became effective in May, 2008. Accordingly, it was not a record before the 
hearing officer. Likewise, it is not a record in the proceedings here under review. 
It is unduly prejudicial to Appellants in that it purports to defeat one of Appellants' 
arguments here under appeal that Appellees had no standing to bring the original 
Petition. This new subsection (e) permits the executive director to request a 
hearing officer "review a dispute regarding any benefit, right, or obligation...." 
Obviously, the director did not have such authority prior to 2008. Thus, it has no 
probative value in a 2007, dispute contesting the extent of the board's [executive 
director's] authority. 
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It is a new law, a law not in effect at the time the Order under appeal was 
generated. Accordingly, Appellants respectfully requests it be stricken from the 
Record on appeal and given no consideration by this reviewing court. 
Date: 28, May 2008 submitted; 
NOTE: 
[If the Court denies the request to strike the 2008 version of the law, Appellants 
would point out that clearly before May, 2008, our legislature had never given the 
executive director/board any authority to request a review of a dispute. Since the 
board's [executive director's] underlying Request for Declaratory Relief was made 
before the enactment of the new law, it violated such law when filed and 
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